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SYMPOSIUM: FURMAN'S LEGACY: NEW




A 2018 decision in the Arizona Supreme Court raised new
strong claims that the death penalty in the U.S. has become a "fatal
lottery,"1 with critical implications for its constitutionality and its
future in American criminal law.2 In the case, Hidalgo v. Arizona, the
defense provided preliminary evidence that over the past twenty years,
nearly 98% of all first- and second-degree murder defendants in
Maricopa County-the state's largest county and location of the
nation's fifth largest city-were death-eligible.3 The Arizona Supreme
* Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia Law School;
Professor of Epidemiology, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University.
We thank the Academy for Justice at the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at
Arizona State University for its generous support for the Symposium. The Academy
for Justice is dedicated to making non-partisan, fact-based academic research
available to broad audiences with the goal of creating a criminal justice system in
which actual practices reflect best practices.
1. Scott Phillips & Alena Simon, Is the Modern Death Penalty a Fatal
Lottery? Texas as a Conservative Test, 3 LAWS 85, 92 (2014) (describing the pattern
of arbitrary and capricious death sentencing as a "fatal lottery").
2. Petition for Certiorari, Hidalgo v. Arizona, No. 17-251, 2017 WL 3531089
at *1 (Aug. 14, 2017).
3. Id. Hidalgo's defense team submitted empirical evidence showing that of
the 866 first degree murder cases prosecuted in Maricopa County between 2002 and
2012, 97.8% were capital-eligible. See CASSIA SPOHN, AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES IN FIRST-DEGREE MURDER CASES, MARICOPA COUNTY, AZ: 2002-
2012 (2018), https://ccj.asu.edu/sites/default/files/death penalty report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3TJK-FSNL]. Two different versions of the Arizona statute, one
with 10 factors and a second with 14 factors, failed to perform the constitutionally
required narrowing.
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
Court conceded this point even as it rejected Mr. Hidalgo's appeal.4
What the Arizona Supreme Court conceded, and what the evidence
showed, was the expansive criteria for death eligibility made it
impossible for states to "perform the 'constitutionally necessary'
narrowing function at the stage of legislative definition" to prevent "a
pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing.
'5
Nearly fifty years ago, in Furman v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme
Court cited these same conditions as violating the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause to rule the
nation's death penalty statutes unconstitutional.6 This overbreadth is
exactly the opposite of the constitutional requirements set forth over
fifty years ago in Furman7 and four years later in Gregg,8 seminal U.S.
Supreme Court decisions that changed the landscape of capital
punishment and created the architecture of the modem death penalty.
These cases sought to avoid not only arbitrary but racist outcomes by
narrowing capital punishment to a very small subset of cases.9
4. State v. Hidalgo, 390 P.3d 783, 791 (Ariz. 2017) (assuming that "Hidalgo
is right in his factual assertion that nearly every charged first degree murder could
support at least one aggravating circumstance").
5. Id. See also Hidalgo v. Arizona, 138 S. Ct. 1054, 1057 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
statement respecting the denial of certiorari) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 878 (1983)). The Furman Court stated that narrowing was necessary to avoid
a pattern of arbitrary and capricious punishments that would violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 295 (1972).
6. Furman, 408 U.S. at 295; see David C. Baldus, George Woodworth,
Michael Laurence, Jeffrey Fagan, Catherine M. Grosso & Richard Newell, Furman
at 40: Constitutional Challenges from California's Failure to (Again) Narrow Death
Eligibility, 16 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 693 (2019).
7. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (stating that a
death -sentencing procedure is unconstitutional if it provides "no meaningful basis
for distinguishing the few cases in which [death] is imposed from the many cases
in which it is not.").
8. 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("Furman mandates that
where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion
must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action.").
9. The Furman Court linked arbitrary patterns of sentencing with racial
disparities in sentencing: "It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty
inflicted on one defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of
his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a
procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices." 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas,
J., concurring); see also Catherine M. Grosso, Jeffrey Fagan, Michael Laurence,
David Baldus, George Woodworth & Richard Newell, Death by Stereotype: Race,
Ethnicity and California's Failure to Implement Furman's Narrowing Requirement,
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Following the denial by the Arizona Supreme Court but citing
its acceptance of the validity of his evidentiary claim, Mr. Hidalgo
turned to the U.S. Supreme Court for a review of Arizona's capital
sentencing statute. He again advanced his claim that with so many
aggravating circumstances, almost every defendant convicted of first-
degree murder would be eligible for the death penalty, a gross violation
of Furman's narrowing requirement and in violation of the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause. 10
Although the Supreme Court declined to take the Hidalgo
case,11 Justice Breyer and three other Justices issued a statement
calling for further analysis of whether states have complied with the
narrowing requirements set forth in the two core cases of Furman and
Gregg. 12 Breyer's statement noted that "evidence of this kind warrants
careful attention and evaluation."13 He went on to say that "capital
defendants may have the opportunity to fully develop a record with the
kind of empirical evidence" that can put these claims to a constitutional
test. 14
Justice Breyer's Statement signaled that four sitting Justices
shared deep concerns about whether "states perform the
'constitutionally necessary' narrowing function at the stage of
legislative definition" to prevent "a pattern of arbitrary and capricious
sentencing."15 The Statement went a step further, suggesting a
willingness to ask whether statutes, in their operation, are
constitutionally suspect, and to apply empirical evidence to address
this question. The Furman questions have expanded since the
66 UCLA L. REV. 1394 (2019) (finding that several of California's aggravating
circumstances are applied disparately based on the race or ethnicity of the
defendant).
10. Petition for Certiorari, Hidalgo v. Arizona, No. 17-251, 2017 WL 3531089
at *1 (Aug. 14, 2017). Following Gregg, Arizona provided nine statutory
aggravators. At the time of Hidalgo's conviction, the Arizona statute contained 10
aggravators. By the time Mr. Hidalgo filed his petition for certiorari, Arizona had
14. Subsequently, on April 10, 2019, the Arizona Governor signed legislation that
removed or significantly modified three of the statutory aggravators: (1) if the
defendant created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the person
murdered; (2) if the offense was committed in a cold, calculated manner without
pretense of moral or legal justification; and (3) if the defendant used a remote stun
gun in the commission of the offense as defined in the statute. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-751 (2019).
11. Hidalgo v. Arizona, 138 S. Ct. 1054, 1054 (2018).
12. Id. (Breyer, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari).
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resumption of executions following Gregg. What now matters is not just
the statutory architecture of death eligibility-the number of
aggravators-but also their scope or reach and their ability to narrow
to distinguish "the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not."
' 16
Developing the fact record that Justice Breyer suggests would
provide the basis for assessing the constitutionality of a death penalty
statute requires a set of thorough, well-designed empirical studies of
potentially death-eligible homicides spanning several decades and
across several statutory contexts. Determining the breadth of Arizona's
and other states' statutes requires analyses of the underlying facts of
thousands of homicide cases to estimate the rate of death eligibility
among them. Because there is no centralized repository of this
information, these studies require the collection of records from
multiple courthouses and law enforcement agencies, systematic
encoding of the information, and analyses tailored to specific statutory
eras to determine how broadly the statute operates. It is a daunting
challenge, but one that a community of scholars is prepared to meet.
The essays in this Symposium are a first step in that direction.
INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM
This Symposium introduces new research from death
sentencing states and local jurisdictions to begin the task of meeting
Justice Breyer's challenge. Researchers and legal scholars convened at
Columbia Law School in October 2019 to present empirical and
doctrinal scholarship that examines the extent and sources of the
overbreadth of capital statutes that was shown fifty years ago in
Furman. That overbreadth has re-emerged to show that the failure to
narrow is endemic in many of the nation's death sentencing statutes.
These contributions illustrate several features of both statutory design
and the institutional practices that replicate the conditions cited by the
Furman court to produce regimes of overbreadth, arbitrariness and
racial and ethnic disparities.
Professors Catherine Grosso, Barbara O'Brien, and Julie
Roberts follow the blueprint designed by Anthony Amsterdam in 2007
16. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (White, J., concurring); see John
Mills, How to Assess the Real World Application of a Capital Sentencing Statute: A




in this law review17 to develop a thick case study of death charging and
sentencing practices in Hamilton County, Ohio. 18 The county, which
includes Cincinnati, sits on the southern border of Ohio, across the
Ohio River from Kentucky. Its history reflects a set of customs and
social structures that span both the southern U.S. states and their
industrialized northern counterparts. The authors show that over a
twenty-five-year period, racial discrimination combines with diffuse
statutory eligibility criteria to animate and instantiate the twin
concerns of the Furman court: arbitrary death sentences that are
imposed in a discriminatory pattern on African-American defendants.
Drawing on a historical record and longstanding patterns of
discrimination by police and courts, their analysis shows the
endogeneity of capital punishment and racial bias in everyday
practices in the courts, built on a racially troubled policing regime.
Their explanation of the sources and extent of disparate death-seeking
follows what Professor Amsterdam envisioned in his call for analyses
of death penalty statutes and practices in a rich and deeply
contextualized manner.
Hannah Gorman and Margot Ravenscroft, each both a litigator
and advocate, remind us that Florida has been among the most
aggressive death sentencing states since Furman, and also among the
most controversial. 19 Its record of legislative activism created a one-
way ratchet to expand death eligibility starting almost immediately
after the 1972 Furman ruling. Florida's statute includes twenty-six
enumerated aggravators,20 and it was one of the first states to create
death eligibility for drug delivery in a death.21 Florida's patterns of
death sentencing, exonerations, and Supreme Court interventions set
it apart from nearly every other death sentencing state. Florida's
legislature has battled to retain its unrealistic and rigid view of
intellectual disability, and delegates the narrowing function to the
prosecutor, not the legislature, in a statutory design similar to the
17. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty
Before and After McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 49 (2007).
18. Catherine M. Grosso, Barbara O'Brien & Julie C. Roberts, Local History,
Practice, and Statistics: A Study on the Influence of Race on the Administration of
Capital Punishment in Hamilton County, Ohio (January 1992-August 2017), 51
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 904 (2020).
19. Hannah L. Gorman & Margot Ravenscroft, Hurricane Florida: The Hot
and Cold Fronts of America's Most Active Death Row, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
937 (2020).
20. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a) (2019).
21. FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04(3), 775.082 (2019).
2020]
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
defects that Justice Breyer cited in Hidalgo.22 Gorman and Ravenscroft
reveal empirically how the extent of regional disparity, exploitation by
prosecutors of the non-unanimity requirement and statutory
expansiveness, and the failure to regulate juror misunderstanding of
such basic elements of law as mitigation, create a picture of a de-
regulated death penalty system and a dense matrix of Furman
problems.
Alexis Hoag is a litigator with deep experience in the
convergence of race and arbitrariness in regimes of capital punishment
in the U.S. Her doctrinal contribution to the Symposium locates the
overbreadth of capital punishment with its seemingly endemic racial
disparity in Fourteenth Amendment equal protection doctrine.2 3 She
departs from the robust claims of racial bias in charging and
sentencing of Black defendants, empirical claims that have been muted
as constitutional bases of discrimination in the three decades since
McCleskey v. Kemp14 shut down such claims absent a smoking gun of
intentional bias.2 5 Hoag pivots to the robust empirical evidence of bias
in charging and sentencing of killers of White victims, and the
inattention by prosecutors in charging defendants of all races and
ethnicities to justice for those victims.2 6 This devaluation of Black life
demands a constitutional remedy under Equal Protection, over and
above the Eighth Amendment protections against arbitrary and
capricious death sentences. This diminution of the value of life is the
essence of Equal Protection law. But the rush to balance these scales
without a surgical reduction in eligibility would inevitably worsen the
problems of arbitrariness that infect the modem death penalty. For
Hoag, abolition of the death penalty is the answer to resolve this
tension and balance the values of all lives.
Professor Mona Lynch cites two constitutional flaws in
California's expansive list of "special circumstances," or statutory
22. Hidalgo v. Arizona, 138 S. Ct. 1054, 1057 (2018) (Breyer, J., statement
respecting the denial of certiorari).
23. Alexis Hoag, Valuing Black Lives: A Case for Ending the Death Penalty,
51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 985 (2020).
24. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
25. See Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 45-47. See, e.g. Randal Kennedy,
McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv.
L. Rev. 1388, 1392 (1988) (discussing in-group bias in black homicides).
26. Hoag is careful to locate the devaluation of Black victim lives but never
loses sight of the deep and persistent bias toward Black defendants.
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aggravators.27 First is the startling overbreadth of the California death
eligibility statute.28 If the legislature is responsible for the narrowing
task proscribed by Furman,29  then California has failed
spectacularly.30 The breadth of these eligibility factors creates an
extraordinarily broad and heterogeneous defendant population. This
leads directly to the second problem: the "messier' practice assigned to
juries to decide whether the presence of one or more of these
circumstances merits a death sentence. Lynch shows how jurors are
"swamped" by these multiple indicia of death eligibility, and exerts
undue influence on the jury's sentencing decision. The breadth of these
factors burdens jurors who then have to weight these expansive and
standardless criteria against mitigation evidence. That jurors have a
hard time understanding and applying the law, and making life or
death decisions, is revealed in startling and troubling results of a
unique set of empirical studies.
Professors Scott Phillips and Trent Steidley expand on Phillips'
earlier work on Texas' "fatal lottery" to develop evidence of a
"systematic lottery" where certain victim-offender killings are
systematically declared death eligible, while victim-offender cases are
often ignored.31 They restate the Furman and Hidalgo claims of
arbitrariness and overbreadth as two sides of the same coin: death
sentencing as so rare as to be "virtually random," and "yet death
sentences are patterned by the race and gender of the victim." Phillips
and Steidley make the trenchant insight into the intersection of the
Hidalgo and Furman claims: that the death penalty can be
indiscriminate and discriminatory at the same time. The work takes
27. Mona Lynch, Double Duty: The Amplified Role of Special Circumstances
in California's Capital Punishment System, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1010
(2020).
28. David C. Baldus et al., Furman at 40, supra note 6 (showing that over
90% of first degree murder convictions are death eligible under California's "special
circumstances.").
29. Hidalgo, 138 S. Ct. at 1054 (Breyer, J., statement respecting the denial
of certiorari) ("To satisfy the 'narrowing requirement,' a state legislature must
adopt 'statutory factors which determine death eligibility' and thereby 'limit the
class of murderers to which the death penalty may be applied."').
30. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem:
Aggravating Factors in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING
STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 81, 81 (Austin Sarat
ed., 1999) (describing the continuous expansion of death eligibility by the California
legislature for over a decade beginning with the reinstatement of the death penalty
in 1977).
31. Scott Phillips & Trent Steidley, A Systematic Lottery: The Texas Death
Penalty, 1976 to 2016, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1043 (2020).
2020]
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on added importance by focusing on Texas, the most active death
sentencing and execution state in the U.S. since reinstatement of
capital punishment following Gregg.
32
A critical implication of the Hidalgo litigation is its reliance on
a single-county case study of Maricopa County.33 Despite the
limitations in the evidence record in Hidalgo, Justice Breyer's
statement, signed by three other Justices, suggests that a single-
county case study can have constitutional weight in the jurisprudence
of capital punishment. Professors Steven Shatz, Michael Pierce, and
Glenn Radelet provide evidence-from the largest single-county case
study to date-of systematic bias in charging and sentencing, patterns
that replicate the statewide evidence in McCleskey over thirty years
ago showing particular bias in cases of Black defendants killing White
victims. 34 Shatz and colleagues point out that the McCleskey court was
amenable to "a sufficiently large single-county study" that can
reproduce the statewide findings in that case. The patterns of bias and
overbreadth in San Diego County align with Professor Lynch's showing
of the potential for bias and error in the capacious death eligibility
criteria in California. These discoveries, when viewed along Professor
Grosso and colleagues' showing in Hamilton County (Ohio), begin to
form what Amsterdam envisioned in his original blueprint:35 a link
between social contexts and empirical analyses to show an emerging
pattern of county-level constitutional as applied defects in the
administration of the death penalty. 36
32. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion); see Death
Sentences in the United States Since 1977, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts -and-research/sentencing-data/death-sentences-
in -the -united-states -from- 1977 -by-state-and -by-year [https://perma.cc/PM3T-
4RXW]; Executions Overview, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenalty
info.org/executions/executions -overview [https://perma.cc/3LDL-BLJ8].
33. The city of Phoenix in Maricopa County is the fifth most populous city in
the U.S., the largest state capital, and the only state capital with a population of
more than one million residents. Its land area is greater than New York, Los
Angeles, or Chicago. Bernard Goth, Take That, Philly: Phoenix Reclaims the Title
of 5th-Largest U.S. City, REPUBLIC (May 25, 2017), https://azc.cc/2rSz8Wl
Shttps://perma.cc/JGP2 - JCZ].
34. Steven F. Shatz, Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Ethnicity,
and the Death Penalty in San Diego County: The Predictable Consequences of
Excessive Discretion, 51 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1072 (2020).
35. Amsterdam, supra note 17.
36. See Baldus et al., supra note 6; Grosso et al., supra note 9.
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Prior to the repeal of Colorado's death penalty statute37 in
March 2020,38 research on overbreadth and racial discrimination in
charging and sentencing in the state had revealed the pattern of
constitutional defects that the Furman39 Court had warned against
nearly 50 years ago.40 The essay in this volume by Professors Sam
Kamin and Justin Marceau, Hidalgo v. Arizona and Non-Narrowing
Challenges,41 reveals not only the presence of the Furman defects of
capricious, arbitrary and biased death sentencing in Colorado, but the
presence of the same conditions of overbreadth that plagued the
Arizona statute discussed by Justice Breyer in his statement in the
denial of certiorari in Hidalgo.42 Kamin and Marceau join the Furman
and Hidalgo challenges to provide a blueprint for a state-level
challenge highlighting the insurmountable obstacles to resolving the
defects cited in Furman and the aspirations of the Gregg43 design to
remedy those flaws. Their focus on the capacity of a death statute to
narrow provides the blueprint for the future empirical work, where the
fundamental empirical facts about a statute's inability to narrow are
transparent and are blended with the trial facts that draw directly on
the defective statute, to provide a record that can only be denied if a
court is willing to simply set aside its own constitutional foundations
and precedents.
37. Colorado SB20-100 repealed the death penalty for all previously death-
eligible crimes committed on or after July 1, 2020.
38. Andrew Kenney, Colorado Death Penalty Abolished, Polis Commutes
Sentences of Death Row Inmates, COLORADO PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.cpr.org/2020/03/23/polis-signs-death-penalty-repeal-commutes-
sentences-of-death-row-inmates/ [https://perma.cc/B2GZ-TCS9].
39. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 295 (1972). See Baldus et al., Furman
at 40, supra note 6.
40. See, e.g., Meg Beardsley, Sam Kamin, Justin Marceau, & Scott Phillips,
Disquieting Discretion: Race, Geography & the Colorado Death Penalty in the First
Decade of the Twenty-First Century, 92 DENV. L. REV. 431 (2015). Prior to repeal,
Colorado juries had not handed down any death sentences in over a decade, and the
state's last execution was in 1997. Colorado juries had not imposed any death
sentences in a decade, and the state's last execution was more than 20 years ago,
in 1997. In 2013, then-Governor John Hickenlooper imposed a moratorium on
executions, calling the state's death penalty system flawed and inequitable.
Colorado Becomes the 2 2 ,d State to Abolish the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR. (Mar. 24, 2020), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/colorado-becomes-
22nd-state-to-abolish-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/9MY5-GQFE].
41. Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Hidalgo v. Arizona and Non-Narrowing
Challenges, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1101 (2020).
42. Hidalgo v. Arizona, 138 S. Ct. 1054, 1054 (2018) (statement of Breyer, J.,
respecting the denial of certiorari).
43. Gregg v Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion).
2020]
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In the final essay in the Symposium, Restoring Empirical
Evidence to the Pursuit of Evenhanded Capital Sentencing, Joseph
Perkovich, a capital defense attorney, revisits the Hidalgo holding in
the Arizona Supreme Court44 and the denial of certiorari by the U.S.
Supreme Court.45 He links Justice Breyer's call for an empirical
assessment of the constitutional weight of statistical evidence to the
precedents set in two earlier U.S. Supreme Court precedents hat
perhaps should have but didn't turn on statistical evidence: Lockhart
v. McCree46 and McCleskey v. Kemp. 47 In each case, the Court turned a
blind eye to evidence that it otherwise accepted as "methodologically
valid": Lockhart on stacking the deck in jury composition with death-
inclined jurors48 and McCleskey on racial discrimination by prosecutors
in their decisions to seek the death penalty.49 Like the evidence in
Hidalgo, the facts in these cases carried enormous weight in the
constitutional adjudication of capital punishment, but were swept
away with some animus by the Court. Perkovich calls for the reversal
of the Court's anti-science hostility toward the types of robust evidence
proffered in each of these cases, asking instead for an open-minded and
neutral embrace of the types of complex statistical evidence and
experimentation that Justice Breyer and the other justices seek to
apply in Hidalgo. His solution goes beyond the Hidalgo episode to
create a place for carefully empirically crafted adjudicative facts to
bear strong weight in resolving colorable constitutional claims on the
death penalty. In doing so, Perkovich returns us to Professor
Amsterdam's blueprint not just on claims of race bias, but on the
necessity for a rich and deep body of empirical evidence to resolve
constitutional challenges to capital punishment. 50
We are at a unique and critical moment in the future of the
death penalty in the United States. Justice Breyer has opened a new
path for researchers and legal scholars to assess the constitutionality
of the death penalty, and to create a space for empirical facts that
speak directly to the doctrinal issues in constitutional adjudication of
capital punishment that have occupied the Court since well before
44. State v. Hidalgo, 390 P.3d 783 (Ariz. 2017).
45. Hidalgo, 138 S. Ct. at 1054.
46. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
47. 481 U.S. 270 (1987).
48. 476 U.S. at 173.
49. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987).
50. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before and
After McCleskey, supra note 17.
[51.3
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Furman.51 The articles in this Symposium shed light on this path,
showing the critical intersection of Eighth Amendment arbitrariness
and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violations in the
emerging jurisprudence of the death penalty, including the centrality
of race in both constitutional defects. These studies present a new way
to challenge the basic architecture of the modem death penalty,
building on and merging the existing doctrines. They illustrate a
paradigm for empirical constitutional research on the modern practice
of capital punishment, and whether Furman's constitutional design
can cure what may be incurable flaws.
51. Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Probabilistic Causation in
the Law, 176 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECONOMICS 4, 13 (2020)
(recognizing and arguing for a larger role of empirical evidence and counterfactual
reasoning in resolving legal questions).
2020]
